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FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER: 
RELATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF COVENANTS NOT 
TO COMPETE, TRENDS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
EMPLOYEE MOBILITY POLICY 
Norman D. Bishara* 
Covenants not to compete (“noncompetes”) remain a controversial 
tool for employers to restrict employee post-employment mobility, 
particularly in an increasingly cross-jurisdictional business world.  Amid 
the growing attention focused on the impact of noncompetes in legal and 
business academic literature, scholars have begun to use interpretations of 
the strength of enforcement of these post-employment restrictions to assess 
barriers to employee mobility and knowledge diffusion.   
 Unlike previous research, this article systematically, and with an in-
depth examination of both case law and legislation, gauges the relative 
strength of noncompete enforcement across the United States based on 
multiple factors at two periods.  Accordingly, the article presents trends in 
noncompete enforcement policy and evaluates these results in light of the 
legal literature arguing that an interjurisdictional market for law exists.  
The article concludes with an evaluation of the implications and future use 
of these findings for policymakers, businesses, and employees, as well as 
recommendations for additional research. 
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However, the status quo on non-compete law is unacceptable, as 
workers are being unnecessarily chilled out of the job market . . . 
during this rough economy.  Their skills and qualifications are 
being wasted, and ambitious and productive workers are moving 
to California, which refuses to recognize such agreements.  In the 
long run, this legislation is good for workers and good for 
business.
1
 
Robert S. Mantell, President, Massachusetts Employment Lawyers 
Association
2
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Controversy surrounding the impact and use of covenants not to 
compete continues to grow, while at the same time the use of these contract 
clauses in the employment relationship is also on the rise.  Do these 
agreements have a significant impact on worker mobility?  What happens 
when a worker who signed one of these restrictive covenants crosses state 
lines to work for a competitor?  Do these contracts foster human capital 
investment more than they hinder innovation?  The answers to these 
important questions depend on the resolution of another crucial question, 
which until now has been left largely unaddressed as a comprehensive 
issue:  what exactly are all of the fifty states and the District of Columbia 
doing with regard to enforcing these agreements, under what circumstances 
will they enforce them, and, relative to other jurisdictions, how do these 
state-level policies compare to each other in terms of how various 
stakeholders are given preferential protections? 
 
 1. Letter from Robert S. Mantell, President, Mass. Emp’t Lawyers Ass’n, to William 
Brownsberger and Lori Ehrlich, Mass. State Representatives (May 20, 2010) (on file with 
author), available at http://willbrownsberger.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/noncompete-
let-wbro3.pdf (endorsing An Act to Prohibit Restrictive Employment Covenants, H. 4607, 
186th Sess. (Mass. 2009)). 
 2. The Massachusetts Employment Lawyers Association (MELA, an advocacy group, 
describes itself as:  
[A] voluntary association of lawyers dedicated to advancing the rights of 
individual employees in the workplaces of Massachusetts.  MELA is affiliated 
with the National Employment Lawyer’s Association.  Like our national 
counterpart, our purpose and goal is to protect and promote the rights of 
working people through litigation and advocacy on behalf of our clients and 
through the important work done by our standing committees. 
THE MASSACHUSETTS EMPLOYMENT LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, http://www.massnela.org (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
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While the debate over employment contracts that restrict employee 
mobility in many jurisdictions continues to accelerate among policy 
makers, business leaders, and employee advocates, there is a growing body 
of legal research into the use and enforcement of the post-employment 
contractual restrictions known as covenants not to compete (―non-compete 
agreements,‖ or simply, ―noncompetes‖).3  This work recognizes that 
variant approaches to the enforcement of these agreements across 
jurisdictions holds implications for the free mobility of employees and for 
employer interests in restricting the unfettered flow of human capital.
4
  
Similarly, empirical work from non-legal business and other academic 
disciplines such as finance, strategy, sociology, and business economics 
has also begun to use rudimentary measures of noncompete enforcement as 
an input in studies of how these agreements impact workers and 
businesses.
5
 
However, there has not been a systematic legal analysis-based 
approach to rating the states in terms of the relative strength of enforcement 
that takes into account the subtleties of a complete common law and 
legislative analysis.  Without such an organized and detailed picture it is 
not possible to view the trends in enforcement across the states or have 
evidence to conclude if enforcement has been increasing or decreasing over 
the last decades.  Despite this significant gap in the business law literature 
regarding noncompetes, scholars rooted in various business disciplines 
have argued that noncompetes are part of a market for law that is putting 
private interests ahead of state interests
6
 or allowing an employer’s anti-
competitive interests in noncompetes to subvert the interests of individual 
employees.
7
 
 
 3. These agreements come in a variety of forms, such as a clause in a longer 
employment contract or as separate contracts.  For the purposes of this paper, these 
agreements concern post-employment activities of employees and the term does not by itself 
refer to restrictions on competition related to former owners or shareholders after the sale of 
a business. 
 4. See generally Gillian Lester & Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee 
Restrictive Covenants: An American Perspective, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 389 (2010) 
(discussing choice of law and forum for U.S. noncompetition agreement enforcement). 
 5. Examples of such recent works are discussed in detail in Part II.  See, e.g., Matt 
Marx, Deborah Strumsky & Lee Fleming, Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete 
Experiment, 55 MGMT. SCI. 875 (2009); Toby E. Stuart & Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events 
and the Distribution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 175 (2003); and Mark J. 
Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Non-competition Agreements, Executive Compensation and 
Firm Investment, J. L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming) (Advance Access published Nov. 3, 
2009, doi: 10.1093/jleo/ewp033). 
 6. See Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Rules and Institutions in Developing a 
Law Market: Views from the United States and Europe, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2147, 2149 (2008) 
(―The second [choice-of-law] revolution replaces state interests with those of individual 
parties and firms due to their ability to choose the laws that suit their needs.‖). 
 7. See Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Non-Compete 
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There is, however, a gap in the basic assumptions undergirding this 
research.  Essentially, researchers have been using a simplistic analysis of 
noncompete enforcement to cherry-pick certain states for analysis, without 
adequately appreciating the subtleties of how complex and varied legal 
decision-making can be and how enforcement policy evolves.  Moreover, 
because there has not been a complete picture of the relative strength of 
enforcement across the states, there also has not been an adequate body of 
research with which to challenge arguments about the use of noncompetes 
in an interjurisdictional race to the bottom. 
This article will build off of the existing research into the theory of 
balancing individual and firm interests in noncompete enforcement
8
 and 
pair it with a survey of the relative strength of enforcement across the 
United States.  The methodology used in developing a more complete 
picture of noncompete enforcement trends over time incorporates the raw 
data available in a state-by-state treatise alongside an original evaluation 
rubric to evaluate and eventually rank state levels of enforcement.  Notably, 
this analysis will be made freely available to other researchers in an 
electronic format.  Thus, it has the potential to have an influence on future 
empirical work on the impact of noncompetes that is undertaken in other 
business disciplines in which evidence of noncompete enforcement is a 
factor in evaluating employee mobility and the related spillovers.  Once 
this analysis is complete and presented, the article then evaluates previous 
assumptions of increased noncompete enforcement and claims that 
enforcement actions by firms in favorable jurisdictions are evidence of a 
so-called market for law. 
As an initial premise, the article predicts that there is significant 
variation in strength of enforcement on the margins of the completed 
sample of jurisdictions, but that most states will moderately enforce 
noncompetes using the standard reasonableness test.  This finding would 
thus weaken arguments that noncompetes are evidence of a vibrant and 
potentially harmful race to the bottom in states marketing their legal 
regimes, ostensibly at the behest of employers.  A finding that various 
jurisdictions are nonetheless still evolving in their approach to noncompete 
 
Agreements: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1381, 1422 (2008) (―As a whole, employers facing a substantial risk of employee 
competition have powerful incentives to choose the applicable law and find a hospitable 
judicial, rather than arbitral, forum when anticipating the need to enforce noncompetition 
agreements.‖). 
 8. See Norman D. Bishara, Balancing Innovation from Employee Mobility with Legal 
Protection for Human Capital Investment: 50 States, Public Policy, and Covenants Not to 
Compete in an Information Economy, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006) (arguing 
the benefits and costs of enforcement with regard to certain classes of workers can be 
moderated by policymakers to the greatest benefit of positive knowledge spillovers 
associated with employee mobility). 
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agreement enforcement would give some support to critics of standardizing 
the law at this stage and to the notion that the states are still acting as 
―policy laboratories‖ on this aspect of human capital management. 
Ultimately, this research will present a subtle yet authoritative view of 
the development of noncompete enforcement and provide evidence of 
trends in enforcement, as well as give guidance for state policymakers, 
businesses, and employees when evaluating the pros and cons of 
negotiating and attempting to enforce a noncompete agreement.  This 
normative discussion of how policymakers and businesses should apply the 
implications of this research will help inform actions that will potentially 
increase the benefits of enforcement and also decrease the uncertainty of a 
noncompete’s effect on securing human capital investments.  To be clear, 
this article does not intend to finalize a full empirical model of noncompete 
enforcement at this stage.  Rather, it presents a previously unavailable view 
of noncompete enforcement strength across all of the states and as a result 
provides evidence and a useful law-based descriptive analysis of this area 
of human capital law and policy.  It also aims to provide a base set of data 
and legal analysis to guide further research, which can use this article as a 
tool to delve into the further effects of noncompetes on mobility, new 
venture creation, and information spillovers. 
Part II presents a background description of covenant not to compete 
enforcement in the United States.  Part III discusses the arguments about 
the market for law among the states and the importance of better 
understanding the relative strength of noncompete policy across the United 
States, particularly because researchers are currently using incomplete and 
unsophisticated data on noncompete enforcement.  Part IV presents the 
research and implications of a state-by-state evaluation of seven detailed 
indicators of noncompete enforcement across the states in an initial 
descriptive format.  Next, Part V discusses the findings on the relative 
strength of enforcement across the states within the context of arguments 
that noncompete policy is part of a market for law.  Part VI then addresses 
the implications of this research for policymakers, firms, and individual 
employees.  The article concludes by evaluating the cohesiveness of 
noncompete enforcement across the United States.  That section also 
includes a call for additional research into the impact of noncompete 
enforcement on the employer-employee relationship, and the implications 
for employee mobility and associated knowledge spillovers. 
II. BACKGROUND ON COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 
Covenants not to compete have been a controversial aspect of the 
common law throughout their history and remain an issue of great 
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contention in modern U.S. law.
9
  These agreements have long been viewed 
with suspicion in both English and American common law over the 
concern that noncompetes will impair personal freedom to earn a living and 
have a negative impact, by design, on unfettered competition.
10
  The 
controversy over the restrictive and anti-competitive contractual provisions 
found in covenants not to compete is at least several hundred years old, 
thus predating American common law.
11
 
The fact that these post-employment restraints have been litigated and 
the subject of legislative debate for so long might lead to a conclusion that 
the interpretation of the legitimate purpose and scope of these contracts 
would have by now reached a sort of thoughtful equilibrium of agreement 
across the fifty states (and the District of Columbia).  Much to the contrary 
and to the consternation of employers and employees as business becomes 
increasingly stretched across state and national borders, the enforcement of 
noncompetes is an area of law that is still evolving and occasionally 
unpredictable, as is perhaps the wider area of employment law and 
contracts.
12
 
State-based law in the United States governs noncompetes, as is the 
case with most of the law governing the relationship between employers 
and their employees, employment contracts, and thus, contractual 
restrictions found in the ―law of employee mobility.‖13  This has led to a 
national status quo where, as the research in this article will detail, state law 
and human capital policy related to noncompetes varies such that the 
enforceability of a post-employment restriction on an employee’s mobility 
will be uncertain.  Moreover, the increased importance of knowledge-based 
business activity to employment law
14
 and the economic well-being of 
 
 9. For the authoritative review of the extensive history of restrictive employment 
covenants, see Harlan M. Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
625 (1960). 
 10. Id. at 625-46. 
 11. See Blake, supra note 9.  For another in-depth discussion of the history of 
noncompetes, see Dan Messeloff, Note, Giving the Green Light to Silicon Alley Employees: 
No-Compete Agreements Between Internet Companies and Employees Under New York 
Law, 11 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 711, 711-23 (2001). 
 12. For example, the American Law Institute’s new Restatement on Employment Law 
has been under development for several years; however, the mere notion of restating the 
best practices of employment law is somewhat controversial.  For a brief discussion of the 
controversy and the implications of this research, see infra Part V. 
 13. See Charles Tait Graves & James A. DiBoise, Do Strict Trade Secret and 
Noncompetition Laws Obstruct Innovation?, 1 ENTREP. BUS. L. J. 323, 323 (2007) (calling 
noncompete law, fiduciary duty doctrine, and trade secret law, collectively, ―the law of 
employee mobility‖). 
 14. For a discussion of the changing role of employment law, see generally Rafael Gely 
& Leonard Bierman, The Law and Economics of Employee Information Exchange in the 
Knowledge Economy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 651 (2004) (focusing on the impact of the 
knowledge economy on employment law). 
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states are complicated by the anti-competitive impact of noncompetes. 
This unpredictability can be frustrating for all the parties involved, 
particularly when departing employees relocate to other jurisdictions to 
work for out-of-state competitors or start a competing enterprise of their 
own.  Some scholars have even concluded that overall, increased 
noncompete enforcement in the United States is leading to a situation 
where states are less permissive in allowing employee mobility.
15
 
While the majority of states provide some enforcement of noncompete 
agreements,
16
 as discussed at length below, there are only two extreme 
outliers in terms of restrictions on any noncompete enforceability:  
California and North Dakota.  Due to the size and commercial importance 
of the state, California’s legislation banning contractual restrictions on 
employee mobility is well known.
17
  However, even with its well-settled 
prohibition of noncompetes, California routinely encounters noncompete-
based litigation, sometimes concerning requests to entertain post-
employment restrictions originating in other states.
18
  As the recent 
California Supreme Court case of Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP 
reiterates, states have a strong public policy interest in upholding their law 
related to restrictive covenants when the courts within a state are asked to 
enforce restrictions contrary to that state’s well-settled policy.19 
Despite some agreed-upon basic principles of how these restrictive 
covenants are reviewed by most state courts, there nonetheless exists no 
truly uniform approach across jurisdictions determining exactly what sorts 
of factors are sufficient to support an employer’s claims for injunctive 
relief.  This variance among states in their enforcement of noncompete 
policies can prove frustrating for both employers and employees because it 
may make it difficult to predict the consequences for a departing employee 
when he or she joins an out-of-state competitor or moves to a new 
 
 15. See Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law of Employee 
Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy Approach, 45 AM. BUS. 
L.J. 107, 122-48 (2008) (finding that a so-called ―modern approach‖ in the U.S. to covenant 
not to compete enforcement shows a general trend in the common law and legislation 
toward greater restrictions on employees). 
 16. See generally BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, ED., COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-
BY-STATE SURVEY (2008 and cum. supp. 2009).  See also Garrison & Wendt, supra, note 
15. 
 17. Other than an exception for restrictions on employment choice related to the sale of 
the goodwill of a business, the California legislation is unambiguous in its prohibition of 
restrictive employment covenants:  ―[E]very contract by which anyone is restrained from 
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent void.‖  CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2009). 
 18. See, e.g., Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008) (presenting 
an example of noncompete-based litigation in California); see also David R. Trossen, 
Edwards and Covenants Not to Compete in California: Leave Well Enough Alone, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 539 (2009) (commenting on Edwards, 189 P.3d 285). 
 19. Edwards, 189 P.3d at 290. 
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jurisdiction to start a competing business venture.  Whatever consensus 
exists among the enforcing states has coalesced around a reasonableness 
test that balances the rights of parties to the restrictive covenant while 
assessing the effect on the public interest. 
The State of Massachusetts provides a typical example of how a 
noncompete-enforcing state will analyze these contracts.  For instance, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court in Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc. stated 
a common, broad rule of review for a challenged noncompete.
20
  There, the 
court reiterated that ―[a] covenant not to compete is enforceable only if it is 
necessary to protect a legitimate business interest, reasonably limited in 
time and space, and consonant with the public interest.‖21  Moreover, the 
court emphasized the importance of a case-by-case assessment, stating that 
―[c]ovenants not to compete are valid if they are reasonable in light of the 
facts in each case.‖22  Other enforcing states, such as New York, will more 
explicitly focus on balancing the rights of the stakeholders to the contract, 
in addition to the public interest.
23
  
Courts in enforcing states are nonetheless mindful of the 
anticompetitive nature of noncompetes and are careful to only allow 
enforcement to protect employers from unfair competition and not all 
legitimate competition.
24
  This sentiment recognizes the courts’ focus on 
 
 20. Boulanger v. Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 576-77 (Mass. 2004). 
 21. Id.  The final element is also phrased in some jurisdictions as being ―not injurious to 
the public.‖  See, e.g., Ashland Management, Inc. v. Altair Investments N.A., 869 N.Y.S.2d 
465, 472 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (articulating one of the factors for reasonableness of a 
covenant not to compete to be whether it ―is not injurious to the public‖ (citing BDO 
Seidman v. Hirshberg, 712 N.E.2d 1220, 1223 (N.Y. 1999))). 
 22. Boulanger, 815 N.E.2d at 577. 
 23. See, e.g., BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d at 1223.  In that case, the New York Court of 
Appeals stated the noncompete reasonableness test, and its application in New York, in this 
way: 
The modern, prevailing common-law standard of reasonableness for employee 
agreements not to compete applies a three-pronged test.  A restraint is 
reasonable only if it: (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the 
legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the 
employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.  A violation of any prong 
renders the covenant invalid. 
New York has adopted this prevailing standard of reasonableness in 
determining the validity of employee agreements not to compete.  ―In this 
context a restrictive covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the 
extent that it is reasonable in time and area, necessary to protect the employer’s 
legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not unreasonably 
burdensome to the employee.‖ 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 24. See, e.g., Karpinski v. Ingrasci, 268 N.E.2d 751 (N.Y. 1971) (concluding that an 
oral surgeon in a rural community possessed skills that justified the contractual protection of 
the employer).  But see BDO Seidman, 712 N.E.2d 1220 (holding that an accountant’s 
services and skills were not sufficiently extraordinary to justify a prohibition of the 
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what constitutes a legitimate protectable interest of a business in a given 
jurisdiction. 
As detailed later in this article, eighteen states, or about 35%, have 
some sort of legislation discussing noncompetes.  These states, such as 
Oregon, have taken the step to codify this reasonableness test, providing 
guidance to their courts as to how to implement the state’s noncompete 
policy.
25
  An interesting exception to the usual assumption of equal 
treatment for all categories of employees is the policy adopted by the State 
of Colorado.  Specifically, Colorado allows employers to require, by 
contract, an employee to repay training costs for employment that lasts for 
less than two years, and recognizes noncompetes for ―[e]xecutive and 
management personnel and officers and employees who constitute 
professional staff to executive and management personnel.‖26 
III. THE ROLE OF NONCOMPETES IN CURRENT RESEARCH AND THE 
MARKET FOR LAW 
In recent years there has been an increase in extensive, qualitative 
academic research conducted on noncompetes and their relation to 
employee mobility and knowledge transfer.  It is generally and logically 
assumed that noncompete clauses in employment contracts are widely 
utilized.  However, there is not much evidence available on this point.  
Despite the long-standing controversy over the proper level of noncompete 
enforcement (if any), there is a lack of formalized research into the actual 
enforcement trends across the jurisdictions.  More research on this specific 
element of human capital policy is important because it will provide 
guidance to business and state policymakers who have an interest in 
understanding how various states are responding to pressure to disallow or 
permit noncompetes of all types.
27
  This is consistent with the fact that, 
 
restrictions). 
 25. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 653.295(7)(a) (2007).  Pursuant to this clause: 
(A) Competition by the employee with the employer is limited or restrained 
after termination of employment, but the restraint is limited to a period of time, 
a geographic area and specified activities, all of which are reasonable in 
relation to the services described in subparagraph (B) of this paragraph; 
(B) The services performed by the employee pursuant to the agreement include 
substantial involvement in management of the employer’s business, personal 
contact with customers, knowledge of customer requirements related to the 
employer’s business or knowledge of trade secrets or other proprietary 
information of the employer . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-113(d) (2009). 
 27. Perhaps the most high-profile state that is now in the midst of reevaluating the 
propriety of its current noncompete policy is Massachusetts.  See Will Brownsberger–State 
Representative, Democrat, 24th Middlesex District, 
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despite the considerable ink spilled on the topic of noncompetes, few 
empirical studies of noncompetes by legal scholars exist.  To the contrary, 
understandably most of the academic work in the developing area of 
noncompetes-based research has tended to reflect traditional legal 
analysis
28
 or, to a lesser extent, economically-informed theoretical analysis 
of the contracting aspects of noncompetes.
29
 
One exception is a study of the employment implications of a range of 
public company filings related to top executives, which included a section 
analyzing executive noncompetes.  The study by Dean Stewart Schwab and 
Professor Randall Thomas concluded that, at least with regard to the top 
management contracts available in public filings, noncompetes are widely 
used.
30
  The study looked at Chief Executive Officer (―CEO‖) employment 
contracts from several hundred SEC filings for large U.S. public companies 
and found that of 375 CEO contracts, 253 (67%) contained some sort of 
non-competition clause.
31
  Interestingly, many of the post-employment 
restrictions examined in the study could be triggered by any type of 
employment termination, regardless of whether or not the termination was 
initiated by the employer or employee.
32
 
A. Noncompetes, the Market for Law, and Assumptions about 
Noncompete Agreements 
The potential use of noncompete contracts and the litigation 
surrounding them when disputes arise have been the subject of discussion 
by legal academics for some time
33
 and these writers have also used 
 
http://willbrownsberger.com/index.php/archives/tag/stag-non-competes (last visited August 
18, 2010) (providing draft legislation, commentary, and discussions of the current debate in 
Massachusetts). 
 28. See, e.g., Garrison & Wendt, supra note 15 (utilizing traditional modes of legal 
analysis to propose a theory supporting an inevitable disclosure doctrine). 
 29. See, e.g., Paul H. Rubin & Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to 
Compete, 10 J. LEG. STUD. 93 (1981) (exemplifying an economically-informed style of 
analysis and discussing the efficiency of noncompetes in terms of human capital); Eric A. 
Posner & George G. Triantis, Covenants Not to Compete from an Incomplete Contracts 
Perspective (Univ. of Chi. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Univ. of Chi. Working 
Paper Series, Paper No. 137, 2001), available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/137.EAP_.covenants.pdf (expanding upon the 
economic analysis performed by Rubin & Shedd). 
 30. Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
231, 234 (2006). 
 31. Id. at 254-57. 
 32. Id. at 255. 
 33. See, e.g., Blake, supra note 9 (analyzing how employers might utilize noncompetes 
as a tool to protect against former employees’ actions that may threaten the employer’s 
legitimate business interests). 
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economic theory to predict the optimal use of these contracts.
34
  An 
increase of academic discussion in the research from a variety of 
perspectives in the last decade is due, at least in part, to the resurgence of 
interest in agglomeration economies in the high-technology sector, 
specifically Silicon Valley.
35
  The focus on the role of the absence of 
noncompete enforcement in California and the so-called high-velocity 
labor market in Silicon Valley can be traced to the well-known conclusion 
from Professor Ronald Gilson’s 1999 article, The Legal Infrastructure of 
High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and 
Covenants Not to Compete.
36
  Gilson argues that part of Silicon Valley’s 
ultra-successful agglomeration economy as compared to other similarly-
resourced areas, particularly Route 128 outside Boston, is attributable to 
California’s longstanding ban on noncompetes.37 
The provocative conclusion that noncompetes have a significant role 
in hampering employee mobility and attendant spillovers such as 
innovation and new venture creation has sparked interest among a range of 
non-legal scholars.  Consequently, in the last few years there have been 
several published and ongoing empirical attempts to analyze the role of 
covenants not to compete in employee mobility, levels of human capital 
investment, or as markers of innovation and knowledge transfer, like patent 
citations
38
 and workers moving from being employees to entrepreneurs.
39
  
 
 34. See, e.g., Rubin & Shedd, supra note 29 (applying the general and specific human 
capital dichotomy to noncompetes); see also GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (3d ed. 
1993) (establishing the theory behind general and specific human capital investments); 
Norman D. Bishara, Covenants Not to Compete in a Knowledge Economy: Balancing 
Innovation from Employee Mobility Against Legal Protection for Human Capital 
Investment, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 287 (2006) (using specific and general human 
capital investment theory to advocate for selective enforcement of noncompetes based on 
the type of work involved as a way to increase knowledge spillovers); Posner & Triantis, 
supra note 29, at 2 (utilizing a more intermediate form of economic theory:  ―industry-
specific human capital‖). 
 35. ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN 
SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128 (1994) (employing an urban planning and sociological 
approach to explain the Silicon Valley, California agglomeration economy’s growth and 
development, and the related eclipse of the Route 128 technology cluster near Boston, 
Massachusetts). 
 36. See, e.g., Alan Hyde, The Wealth of Shared Information: Silicon Valley’s High-
Velocity Labor Market, Endogenous Economic Growth, and the Law of Trade Secrets (Sept. 
1998), available at http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hyde/WEALTH.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 
2011). 
 37. Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999). 
 38. While it does not focus on noncompetes, one influential article that uses patent 
citation data to study employee mobility is Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco, & Rosemarie 
H. Ziedonis, Reputations for Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge 
Spillovers via Inventor Mobility, 30 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1349 (2009) (finding that in the 
semiconductor industry, a firm’s reputation for aggressive intellectual property rights 
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Some of the articles directly address covenants not to compete, while 
others use basic information about a jurisdiction’s ―yes‖ or ―no‖ (i.e., a ―0‖ 
or ―1‖ coding protocol) stance on enforcing the contracts at all.40  In 
essence, this stream of research is using various measurements to ask the 
basic question of whether or not noncompetes ―matter‖ for business 
activity
41
 and more public-oriented social goods, such as innovation.
42
 
One of the propositions of this article is that the current empirical 
research in other, non-law disciplines does not utilize a full or nuanced 
legal evaluation of the entire noncompete picture across the United States.  
This oversight is addressed by the review of the states presented below in 
Part III.  However, before the scope and intent of that research can be 
appreciated, it is first necessary to understand where current empirical 
noncompete-based research stands and the legal analysis shortcomings of 
those studies with regard to how noncompete policy across the states is 
construed, and to the extent it is utilized. 
For example, a 2003 study by Toby E. Stuart and Olav Sorenson, 
Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distribution of Entrepreneurial 
Activity, uses noncompete enforcement as a factor in determining the 
geographic placement of new business ventures after a corporate 
acquisition or initial public offering.
43
  Citing the 1996 edition of 
Covenants not to Compete, a State by State Survey,
44
 the study draws on the 
noncompete enforcement policies of the fifty states.
45
  The authors appear 
to independently evaluate some of the statutes and case law covered in the 
treatise, but the level of analysis and legal expertise utilized in construing 
 
reduces the otherwise expected knowledge spillovers). 
 39. See Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 5. 
 40. The amount of attention focused on the normative arguments about the propriety of 
noncompetes when it comes to workers’ rights and issues such as bargaining power 
asymmetries has been much less visible.  One example is Katherine V.W. Stone’s article, 
Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of Human Capital in the Changing 
Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002) (discussing the issue of employee or employer 
human capital ownership and arguing that noncompetes should be disallowed under a 
worker’s rights perspective).  For a discussion of the worker’s rights perspective in the 
available literature, see Bishara, supra note 8, at 311-13. 
 41. This ongoing debate is perhaps summed up best by the title of a working paper 
written by Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Non-Compete Covenants: Incentives to 
Innovate or Impediments to Growth? (Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1411172.  As discussed in this section, 
this is the central unresolved issue and this paper aims to improve the research addressing 
this question by providing a comprehensive and nuanced legal analysis of where the 
evolution of noncompete policy across the United States can been seen in the aggregate. 
 42. See, e.g., Graves & DiBoise, supra note 13 (considering whether noncompete laws 
obstruct innovation). 
 43. Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 5. 
 44. P. JEROME RICHEY, BRIAN M. MALSBERGER, & AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1990 & Cum. Supp. 1991). 
 45. Stuart & Sorenson, supra note 5, at 190, Table 1.1. 
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the states is unclear and their focus is on labeling some states as having 
―weak-legal-regimes‖ related to noncompete enforcement.46 
The Stuart and Sorenson study, as compared to others discussed 
below, seems to have a relatively thorough view of the balance of 
noncompetes, but is focused on measuring the founding of start-up 
companies in the biotechnology industry, and thus somewhat limited in its 
application.  When the authors compared regions where noncompetes were 
enforced (to any degree) to jurisdictions where there was what was seen as 
weak noncompete enforcement, they found, ―strong evidence that interstate 
variance in the enforceability of non-compete covenants in employment 
contracts underlies differences in the dynamics of organizational 
foundings,‖ thus supporting Gilson’s thesis with regard to certain high-tech 
fields such as biotechnology.
47
  However, the subtleties of the variances in 
enforcement across the majority of states that enforce noncompetes to some 
moderate extent are not captured by the focus on ―weak-legal-regimes‖ 
being contrasted only with enforcement regimes.  Thus, this evaluation 
does not fully cover the bulk of the enforcement situations or possible 
industries. 
Another study focused on the lack of noncompete enforcement in 
California and how that impacted employee movement.  That article, Job 
Hopping in Silicon Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-
Foundations of a High Technology Cluster, by Bruce Fallick, Charles A. 
Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, focuses on employee mobility 
comparisons in high-tech regions.
48
  In particular, the authors set out to test 
Gilson’s thesis about the role of noncompete disallowance in California’s 
high-tech Silicon Valley region.
49
  The authors conclude that their ―finding 
of a California effect on mobility lends support to Gilson’s hypothesis that 
the unenforceability of noncompete agreements under California state law 
enhances mobility and agglomeration economies in [Information 
Technology] clusters,‖ but that the effect does not appear in other 
California industry clusters.
50
  Thus, there is less evidence of mobility 
across state lines, than within weak enforcement jurisdictions.
51
 
A limitation of this study is that it is focused on Silicon Valley and 
computer industry mobility within California and comparisons with one 
other state, Massachusetts.
52
  Therefore, the study does not take a national 
 
 46. Id. at 190-91. 
 47. Id. at 197. 
 48. Bruce Fallick, Charles A. Fleischman & James B. Rebitzer, Job Hopping in Silicon 
Valley: Some Evidence Concerning the Micro-Foundations of a High Technology Cluster, 
88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 472 (2006). 
 49. Id. at 472. 
 50. Id. at 481. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 479.  The authors also discuss the limitation of the available data for 
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view of noncompete enforcement or factor in the variance within the 
spectrum of enforcing states.  From the article it is also not clear to what 
extent Massachusetts is considered a moderate or strong enforcement state.  
Rather, it appears that the enforcement element of the Massachusetts 
variable is coded merely as enforcing, without a deeper legally-based 
understanding of the application of Massachusetts’ noncompete policy or 
the implications of court rulings on the computer industry. 
A third example of the recent important empirical work on 
noncompetes is Matt Marx, Deborah Strumsky, and Lee Fleming’s article 
entitled Mobility, Skills, and the Michigan Non-Compete Experiment.
53
  
This study identifies a unique research opportunity, which occurred as a 
result of a legislative quirk when revisions to commercial laws in Michigan 
removed a long-standing prohibition on noncompetes.
54
  The article 
―explores the impact of non-competes on interorganizational mobility by 
exploiting Michigan’s apparently inadvertent 1985 reversal of its 
enforcement policy as a natural experiment.‖55  This example utilizes patent 
data to measure inventor mobility among firms, thus limiting the scope of 
observable employees to highly-skilled workers with a patent portfolio.
56
  
In addition, the variable of state enforcement is, as with the other studies, 
essentially coded as ―enforce‖ or ―not enforce,‖ without any subtle 
variation as to placing the state on the spectrum of enforcement ranging 
from weak to moderate to strong.
57
  In this case the authors are comparing 
patent citations and mobility in Michigan to other ―nonenforcing states‖ 
during a particular time of nonenforcement:  the 1975-2000 period of 
 
extending the research to another high-tech agglomeration economy, Denver, in part due to 
the employee data and uncertainty about the effects of the application of Colorado’s 
exceptions to its noncompete statute.  Id. at 479 n.22. 
 53. Marx, et al, supra note 5. 
 54. Id. (citing the revocation of the Michigan statute, MCL 445, and its replacement 
with the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA) (1985), which did not contain a ban on 
restrictive covenants in employment). 
 55. Id. at 875-76. 
 56. See id. at 876 (declaring that support for the article derives from patent data and ―by 
employing a differences-in-differences method that ameliorates some of the challenges 
inherent in tracking mobility of individuals.‖). 
 57. Only other nonenforcing states were used to contrast with Michigan, and Marx et 
al., included the following states.  However, according to the research discussed below in 
Part III of this paper, not all of them did not enforce noncompetes for the entire period 
before the 1985 Michigan enforcement change:  Alaska, California, Connecticut, Minnesota, 
Montana, North Dakota, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washington, and West Virginia.  The time 
period covered and the definition of ―nonenforcing‖ is not explicitly discussed in the paper.  
Notably, this paper and the research discussed here consider California and North Dakota as 
truly nonenforcing from a statutory, plain-language, definitional perspective, as well as 
settled case law, with the other states relied on by Marx et al., receiving at least some level 
of enforcement ratings at both the 1991 and 2009 observation periods.  Id. at 880. 
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observation.
58
  One advantage of this study over the others discussed here is 
that Marx et al. endeavor to measure interstate mobility on workers by 
tracking inventors and patent citation data across several states. 
However, the article is focused on the impact of an interesting natural 
experiment related to noncompete enforcement, which occurred in 
Michigan only in the 1980s, and is based on patent citation data.  
Therefore, the conclusions are bounded by those constraints.  The fact that 
states in this study are either ―enforcing‖ or ―nonenforcing‖ also highly 
simplifies the important factor of the strength of enforcement within the 
majority of states that do enforce to a lesser or greater extent.  Nonetheless, 
the research is important because it supports Gilson’s thesis of a high-
velocity labor market being tied to an absence of noncompete enforcement.  
This is based on observations that workers in Michigan—both in the 
automobile industry and elsewhere—were less likely to move between 
firms when the state’s prohibition of restrictive employment covenants 
abruptly ended for a period of time.
59
 
Another important contribution to the noncompete literature is Mark J. 
Garmaise’s recent article, Ties that Truly Bind: Non-competition 
Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm Investment.
60
  The article 
essentially takes a law and economics perspective on analyzing 
noncompete agreements and concludes that noncompete enforcement 
increases executive stability and holds down wages.  However, while this 
environment encourages human capital investment by firms in their 
managers, it discourages self-investment in personal human capital by 
those same employees.
61
 
Compared to other empirical studies, Garmaise somewhat delves into 
the subtleties of noncompete enforcement, also by using the Covenants not 
to Compete, a State by State Survey treatise, in this case the 2004 edition.
62
  
In order to develop a noncompete enforcement index, starting at a potential 
zero score, Garmaise looked at twelve questions applied to each state in the 
treatise, assigned each question a threshold and ―granted 1 point for each 
question concerning which its laws lie above the threshold.‖63  He asserts, 
without attribution, that ―laws governing the enforcement of 
noncompetition agreements are largely static . . . .‖64  Accordingly, except 
 
 58. Id. at 882. 
 59. See id. at 887 (suggesting that conclusions drawn from the model used in the paper 
support the Gilson theory). 
 60. Garmaise, supra note 5. 
 61. Id. at 4 (elaborating on the notion that noncompetes discourage employees from 
investing in human capital of their own). 
 62. Id. at 45, Table A1. 
 63. Id. at 46. 
 64. Id. at 15.  This conclusion seems hasty in light of efforts by state policymakers to 
revise noncompete laws, such as in Massachusetts.  Even the observations of Marx et al. 
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for the time-limited view of three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Florida), he 
relies on the 2004 edition of Covenants not to Compete, a State by State 
Survey and its limited summaries to make judgments on the strength of 
noncompete enforcement. 
The benefit of this study is that, compared to the others that have been 
mentioned, there is a finer granularity to the way enforcement is construed 
along a spectrum of weak to strong enforcement.  However, the 
noncompete data is limited by the lack of a comprehensive approach and a 
subtle legal analysis of the material, particularly an in depth review of the 
case law.  It also lacks a theoretical basis for the setting of thresholds and 
the omission of an associated weighting option for each factor. 
The five papers discussed here are known, or are becoming well 
known, among academics concerned with issues of worker mobility and the 
competitive advantage of firms.  Yet, these articles are a representative 
sample of how non-legal researchers are using noncompetes as a variable in 
understanding the movement of labor and knowledge spillovers.  Along 
these lines, other investigations are well underway and concern finite issues 
related to employee mobility, knowledge transfer, innovation, and abuse of 
noncompetes to hold up employers or competitors.  These include topics 
such as the impact of noncompetes as a factor in the movement of high-
value employees,
65
 noncompetes as a factor in jurisdictionally-based 
incentives or for impediments to investment,
66
 and the economics 
perspective of the competitive or predatory nature of ―poaching‖ in a 
noncompete context.
67
  On the whole, the doctrine of noncompete 
enforcement is in a state of flux within a changing business and work 
environment
68
 and the fractious nature of the available research is 
 
related to the tide change in Michigan.  Marx et. al, supra note 5.  The results of this article, 
as presented infra in Part IV, show that while major changes at the state level are relatively 
rare between the snapshots of the policy status quo in 1991 and 2009, there is a trend toward 
greater enforcement overall among the states. 
 65. Arijt Mukherjee, Mariano Selvaggi & Luis Vasconcelos, Star Wars: Exclusive 
Talent and Collusive Outcomes in Labor Markets (Working Paper, 2009), available at 
http://www.bus.umich.edu/Academics/Departments/BE/pdf/2009Oct9Mukgerhee.pdf. 
 66. See Samila & Sorenson, supra note 41, at 16 (following Stuart and Sorensen for a 
marker of ―absence of non-compete enforcement‖ and Garmaise for ―weakness of non-
compete enforcement,‖ thus suffering from the same blunt noncompete evaluation issues 
inherent in those previous studies). 
 67. Jin-Hyuk Kim, Employee Poaching, Predatory Hiring, and Covenants Not to 
Compete (Cornell Univ. Dept. of Econ., Working Paper, 2007), available at 
https://editorialexpress.com/cgi-
bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=IIOC2008&paper_id=16 (discussing instances, in 
light of noncompetes, in which a firm’s behavior in poaching workers from its competitors 
can be either acceptable competition or a predatory act). 
 68. See Richard L. Hannah, Post-Employment Covenants in the United States: Legal 
Framework and Market Behaviours, 149 INT’L LAB. REV. 107, 116 (2010) (reviewing the 
use of noncompetes and the legal rules surrounding their use and concluding that ―[p]ost-
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consistent with this evolution. 
Each of these papers provides insights into the role and use of 
noncompetes and thus each provides a glimpse into the policy and legal 
implications for noncompetes in those limited circumstances.  However, 
most of these papers are primarily concerned with one subset of states, a 
single state, or a single type of worker (e.g., inventors) and therefore do not 
take a national view of the issue of noncompete enforcement policy.  The 
study that looks at all fifty states in a broad way on multiple parameters is 
the one by Garmaise.
69
  However, that study, like the others, does not 
provide a comprehensive, long-view picture of all the states’ policies 
regarding enforcement.  Accordingly, these studies are concerned with 
using an overly-focused snapshot of noncompetes as a variable for specific 
purpose and therefore fail to provide a U.S.-wide view of the policy. 
These existing studies often rely on the use of noncompete 
enforcement as a ―yes‖ or ―no‖ variable found in other studies, which in 
turn have made somewhat dated assumptions about noncompete 
enforcement.  However, the authors of these studies have not necessarily 
conducted their own research into the strength of enforcement and tend to 
rely on the limited summaries provided in the leading aggregate treatise, 
which was intended for a legal practitioner audience.  As confirmed by the 
discussion of the findings and implications below in Part IV.C., there are 
only two states—California and North Dakota—that have virtual bans on 
noncompetes.  The other 49 jurisdictions allow some sort of enforcement, 
but those states by no means have uniform approaches to the extent or type 
of enforcement and under what circumstances it is allowed.  Therefore, the 
relatively simplistic and limited views represented in the small sample of 
states and the ―all or nothing‖ coding for states to enforce or not enforce 
noncompetes misses a great deal of the influential differences among the 
vast majority of states that do allow noncompetes. 
In addition, the issue of the relative strength of enforcement across a 
significant time period and for all of the states has not appeared in the legal 
literature to date.  Stepping back and examining these studies as a group 
from a legal scholarship perspective reveals some inconsistencies and 
shortcomings of the basis for these empirical studies, as discussed 
previously.  Moreover, the verdict on the importance of noncompete law 
and mobility policy—in terms of helping or harming business activity or 
workers’ rights—and the role of noncompetes in key issues such as 
mobility of all types of workers and knowledge transfer is not yet clear. 
 
employment covenants are indicative of the institutional forces that are emerging in the 
twenty-first century labour market . . . [and] the behaviour of firms and workers in regard to 
the post-employment constraints remains highly uncertain because it is dynamic and 
evolving.‖). 
 69. Garmaise, supra note 5. 
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B. Arguments for a Market for Law and Covenants not to Compete 
For nearly four decades, legal scholars have discussed the notion that 
there is a market for corporate law in which states, under pressure from 
elites, will craft their laws to accommodate business interests in what 
becomes the proverbial race to the bottom, often at the expense of other 
stakeholders.
70
  The prime example of a jurisdiction engaging and excelling 
in the market for law is the State of Delaware, where the majority of U.S. 
public companies choose to incorporate and pay corporate charter taxes.
71
  
Beyond the legal scholarship, implications of a market for law have been 
recognized by non-legal business scholars who have found, for instance, 
evidence of such elite lobbying with regard to state laws favoring anti-
takeover provisions to protect corporate management.
72
 
One main reason a state like Delaware can influence corporate choices 
through marketing its laws is the long-standing ―internal affairs doctrine‖ 
(―IAD‖), which allows for the relationships between corporations, their 
managers, and the shareholders to be determined by the law of the state of 
incorporation.
73
  This doctrine is in contrast to the law governing contracts, 
which in the case of the choice-of-law doctrine with regard to a 
noncompete, still requires the state of choice to have a significant 
connection to the agreement.
74
  However, legal scholar Robert Daines 
found that, in part because 97% of public firms incorporate in either their 
home states or in Delaware, bimodal incorporation choices belie the 
metaphors of a race between the states or a unified market for the law 
offered by these fifty jurisdictions.
75
 
 
 70. See Larry E. Ribstein & Erin Ann O’Hara, Corporations and the Market for Law, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 661, 661-62 (2008) (noting the history of the debate that there is a 
market for corporate law and, perhaps, a related ―race to the bottom‖ as popularized by 
scholar William Cary in the mid-1970s). 
 71. Faith Stevelman, Regulatory Competition, Choice of Forum, and Delaware’s Stake 
in Corporate Law, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 59 (2009) (stating that, ―[i]n matters of state 
corporate law, Delaware has won–that is the consensus among scholars, commentators, and 
practicing corporate lawyers‖).  For a recent summary and presentation of arguments related 
to the debate over the reasons for Delaware’s prominence in the market for law, see Larry E. 
Ribstein, The Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131 
(2009). 
 72. See Timothy J. Vogus & Gerald F. Davis, Elite Mobilizations for Antitakeover 
Legislation, 1982-1990, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY 96 (Gerald F. 
Davis, Doug McAdam, W. Richard Scott & Mayer N. Zald eds., 2005). 
 73. Ribstein & O’Hara, supra note 70, at 662-63. 
 74. Id. at 662. 
 75. Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 
1562 (2002) (―The nationwide race or market may be a heuristic for potential competition, 
but it does not describe firm choices during the period studied.  Thus, the dominant 
metaphor of a national race between fifty states or a single market with fifty producers is 
incorrect and potentially misleading.‖). 
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In addition, as has been observed in various contexts, employees tend 
to have less bargaining power than employers during contract 
negotiations,
76
 including when arbitration and noncompetes are 
concerned.
77
  The employer and its agents in management are repeat 
players in negotiating employment and tend to have superior bargaining 
power.
78
  Noncompetes, where they are allowed, are reviewed by courts 
under an examination of the reasonableness of their terms and whether the 
restrictions address the employer’s protectable interest.79  Accordingly, 
these concerns of protecting employee interests have led legal scholars to 
propose new approaches for the noncompete enforcement.  These include 
proposals for courts to take into account the employee’s diminished 
bargaining power in noncompete negotiations,
80
 for a ―de-coupling‖ of 
noncompete and trade secret law and a newly robust doctrine of inevitable 
disclosure,
81
 and the application of the resource-based theory of the firm to 
adjudicating noncompetes related to knowledge ownership disputes.
82
 
Legal scholars have also recently addressed the possible role of 
employment laws as a commodity in the market for law.
83
  Other work 
addresses the issue of whether or not noncompete enforcement policy can 
be evidence for this market.  Specifically, Timothy P. Glynn has argued the 
 
 76. Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 340 (2005) (pointing out that a specific term, the arbitration 
clause, is usually imposed on employees by management, and without any negotiation). 
 77. For a discussion of the concerns related to the poor bargaining power of low-level 
employees, see generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration 
Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law, 155 U. 
PA. L. REV. 379 (2006). 
 78. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts and Worker Mobility: The 
Dilution of Employee Bargaining Power via Standard Form Noncompetes, 2006 MICH. ST. 
L REV. 963, 963–64, 977–80 (discussing management’s substantial advantages at the 
formation stage of employment relationships). 
 79. Gillian Lester, Restrictive Covenants, Employee Training, and the Limits of 
Transaction-Cost Analysis, 76 IND. L.J. 49, 54-57 (2001) (providing an economics-based 
discussion of the legitimate interest and reasonableness review of challenged non-compete 
agreements). 
 80. Kate O’Neill, Should I Stay or Should I Go?–Covenants Not to Compete in a Down 
Economy–A proposal for Better Advocacy and Better Judicial Opinions, 6 HASTINGS BUS. 
L.J. 83, 84 (2010) (proposing that appellate courts ―minimiz[e] the enforcement of 
covenants not to compete where the assenting employee lacks significant bargaining power 
while preserving employers’ abilities to enforce these covenants against employees who 
enjoy such power‖). 
 81. Garrison & Wendt, supra note 15, at 186. 
 82. Norman D. Bishara & David Orozco, Using the Resource-Based Theory to 
Determine Legitimacy in Covenants not to Compete, (Working Paper, 2011) (on file with 
author). 
 83. See, e.g., Richard A. Bales, Explaining the Spread of At-Will Employment Doctrine 
as an Inter-Jurisdictional Race-to-the-Bottom of Employment Standards, 75 TENN. L. REV. 
453, 464-65 (2008) (cataloging the various other areas of law in which inter-state 
competition has been observed). 
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broad theme that noncompete-related state policy is also part of the market 
for law in which jurisdictions race to the bottom to attract business.
84
 
Professor Glynn perceives that states are beginning to enter a market 
for employment contracts, including noncompetes and analyses the 
development from both the supply (state) and demand (employer) side of 
the market for noncompete policy.  In his model he explains that previous 
barriers to ―law-as-commodity competition . . . are neither fundamental nor 
permanent, and there are signs of a changing dynamic.‖85  He reasons 
further that: 
Enhanced employer demand for state employment law is likely to 
arise where (1) there are substantial differences between state 
legal regimes, (2) these differences are significant enough to 
trump employers’ other employment law concerns, and (3) 
employers have some confidence that they can control forum 
selection.  A state that establishes an employer-friendly regime 
may choose to compete for interstate and out-of-state 
employment contracts when it perceives the benefits of 
competition—pleasing home-state employers and enhanced 
counseling and enforcement business—and has a judiciary both 
able and willing to further its competitive aims. And, 
importantly, a state serious about engaging in such competition 
need not rely entirely on other states’ accepting the 
extraterritorial application of its law.  The state can attempt to 
force acceptance of its law through aggressive judicial tactics, for 
example, by racing to judgment.
86
 
Thus, Glynn proceeds on the assumption that there is, indeed, ―a 
substantial difference between state legal regimes‖ that allows for choice of 
law arbitrage of a sort.  The place of litigation and, more importantly, the 
particular state law that is applied to a noncompete dispute is an important 
factor in this market and the attendant race to the bottom.
87
  To best 
evaluate if there is, indeed, the requisite variation in state-level noncompete 
enforcement policy it is crucial to have a full, nationwide understanding of 
 
 84. Glynn, supra note 7, at 1434-36 (discussing why employment law has largely been 
absent from the market for law until recently). 
 85. Id. at 1385. 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
 87. Id. at 1421.  As Glynn explains, this distinction is significant for firms: 
From the perspective of an employer seeking to manage risk, which state’s 
noncompetition law governs the enforcement of NCAs [non-competition 
agreements] also matters—a lot.  Individual employers have a strong incentive 
to keep their employees and intellectual capital from migrating to competitors.  
Indeed, at least with regard to some types of firms or categories of workers, 
employers’ ex ante concerns regarding NCA enforceability against departing 
employees many outweigh all other employment considerations. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 2011] FIFTY WAYS TO LEAVE YOUR EMPLOYER 771 
 
the status quo and trends related to what the fifty states are actually doing 
with regard to their noncompete laws.  That indispensible and complete 
evaluation of the state’s relative level of enforcement is the subject of the 
next section. 
IV. EVIDENCE OF TRENDS IN STATE LAW OF RELATIVE ENFORCEMENT OF 
NONCOMPETES 
Systematically evaluating the covenant not to compete enforcement 
policies of the fifty states, and the District of Columbia, is obviously a 
labor-intense endeavor.  This is a particularly onerous task since 
noncompete policy is an evolving area of law that is comprised of some 
instances of legislation, but the implementation of enforcement primarily 
falls to the state courts, with much of the common law being tied to the 
facts of individual cases. 
This challenge was made manageable by a long-standing treatise 
series, Covenants not to Compete, A State-By-State Survey, which serves as 
a central repository for periodic updates from all fifty-one jurisdictions.
88
  
The series is published approximately every two to four years, and is 
updated with comprehensive supplements in the intervening years.  The 
treatise is organized at the level of each jurisdiction with a portfolio of 
questions, which are then answered briefly and followed with citations to 
relevant authority, including state statutory law, leading cases, and 
secondary sources drawn, for instance, from law review and bar journals. 
For the evaluation described below, the focus was on the seven 
questions from the Covenants not to Compete treatise as a way to organize 
the information gathering and evaluation.  In order to establish some 
context with which to get a broad view of state policies and their evolution 
and trends over time, a two period view of each jurisdiction was taken by 
gathering data from the 1991 treatise and from the recent 2009 version.  
The consistency of the data collected in the Malsberger treatise allows for 
there to be an adequate level of confidence that the same factors are 
recognized over different observation periods.  The gap between 1991 and 
2009 also provides enough time for the law to change, if at all.  One 
potential issue with the space between periods is that there could be 
fluctuations in a state’s policy within the period, which would not be 
captured.  However, ultimately the data does likely show some balance 
across the time periods and evidence of trends, even if these two periods 
represent snapshots of noncompete policy at those years. 
 
 88. The most current edition, and supplements covering updates through 2009, is 
COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE, A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (Brian M. Malsberger ed., 6th 
ed. 2008 & Supp. 2009), supra note 16.  The earlier version in this research is RICHEY, ET 
AL., supra note 44. 
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In general, this data collection, as described below in detail, was 
intended to capture any national trends in enforcement, such as the states 
moving toward or away from the margins of stronger enforcement, over a 
period of nearly two decades.  It will also provide a picture of the relative 
enforcement across jurisdictions and do so in a detailed way that provides 
more subtle shadings than are available from other sources.  The data  
pinpoints the positioning of individual states and be able to show not only 
if those states have adopted stronger or weaker noncompete enforcement 
policies, but it will be able to show how those changes impact their ranking 
among peer jurisdictions and show any geographic concentrations of 
enforcement patterns.  Finally, the goal of this evaluation is also to develop 
more evidence than is currently available to understand the contours of 
noncompete enforcement.  As an additional note, all of this scoring and 
summary ranking data will be made available by the author to other 
interested researchers.
89
 
A. The Approach to Evaluating each State’s Enforcement Policy 
Overall, the goal of rating the states and assigning a raw score based 
on multiple common parameters was to collect evidence of the relative 
enforcement across the entire United States.  To accomplish this, seven 
indicators that tend to indicate strong, moderate, or weak levels of 
noncompete enforcement were examined.  The construct of placing states 
on an enforcement spectrum ranging from weak to moderate to strong 
levels of enforcement was first developed in an earlier article on the role of 
noncompetes in employee mobility in a knowledge economy.
90
  The 
typology is used again here as a way to show variance and potential trends 
as state-level policies evolve over time. 
The advantage to this study over the ones discussed above in Part III is 
that this data collection was conducted from a legal researcher’s 
perspective with the intent to provide a subtle, yet deep, analysis of the 
legal importance of various ligation outcomes as provided by a variety of 
statutory and case law.  Part of the premise of this approach is that a 
business lawyer’s view of the importance of how courts apply rules and the 
nuances of how they enforce a stated policy from the legislature—or, 
alternatively, how in the aggregate a state’s courts will develop its own 
policy—can add value that is not available in the extant noncompete 
literature.  For instance, even though most states employ a reasonableness 
 
 89. Because this data includes an element of assigning weights to influence the ranking 
based on the importance of the question to the dependent variable of strength of 
enforcement, the data can easily be utilized to highlight other outcomes by adjusting the 
emphasis and rationale for the weight factors. 
 90. See Bishara, supra note 8. 
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test to evaluate the contract, the approach, tools, and principles used by 
each court varies materially within the reasonableness structure.  In other 
words, what one set of state courts deem a reasonable restriction on the 
employee’s activities may indeed vary significantly from a court’s 
application of the same standard in another jurisdiction.  States also vary in 
what they consider a protectable interest, thereby having a more or less 
expansive view of what is reasonable for employer’s to restrict.  Moreover, 
the extent to which a court tries to accommodate a request to enforce a 
noncompete through mechanisms such as modifying the terms of the 
contract or otherwise granting partial enforcement is indicative of the 
strength of enforcement. 
Within these nuances and constraints, a researcher trained in the law 
can better gauge the importance and tone of the numerous opinions 
generated by the courts of a given state.  To that end, the seven questions 
listed and discussed below were chosen because they directly address the 
legal issues relevant to measuring a given jurisdiction’s intensity of 
noncompete enforcement.  These questions are the ones applied in the 
Covenants not to Compete treatise, and thus are applied consistently to 
each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.  While these questions 
are not necessarily geared toward the extent of enforceability within each 
jurisdiction, these questions, in the aggregate, can flesh out a full picture of 
a state’s policy on noncompetes, including if the state has contemplated its 
policy to the extent that it has enacted legislation on the topic.  Thus, the 
questions listed below are categories drawn from the Covenants not to 
Compete treatise and are useful benchmarks for a state’s policy during the 
1991 and 2009 time periods. 
“Question 1: Is there a state statute of general application that governs the 
enforceability of covenants not to compete?” 
For this question, a score of 10 was awarded to a state that has a 
statute that favors strong enforcement, a 5 was awarded to a state that either 
did not have a statute or had a statute that was neutral in its approach to 
enforcement and a 0 was given to a state that has a statute that disfavors 
enforcement.  This question was given an overall weight of ten.  It is 
important to note that the available statutes addressing noncompetes vary 
widely and range from encouraging enforcement or segmenting applicable 
categories of workers to banning enforcement of post-employment 
restrictions. 
In this instance, the availability of a statute was considered a strong 
indication the state had considered and weighed the policy options and 
effects related to crafting a noncompete policy.  The content of the statute 
was the most important factor in determining the state’s score.  For 
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instance, statutes that merely restated the common law reasonableness 
standard received a score of 5.  If a state did not have a noncompete–
specific statute passed into law, then it was considered a neutral indicator.  
Two states, California and North Dakota, have consistently had what can 
be described as ―anti-noncompete‖ statutes, which is consistent with their 
public policy stance of not restricting worker mobility.  Several states have 
statutes related to disallowing contracts in restraint of trade.  However, 
reasonable noncompete agreements, sometimes with specific carve outs 
detailed, are a common exception to such legislation. 
“Question 2: What is an employer’s protectable interest and how is that 
defined?” 
When evaluating the important issue of a state’s recognition of what 
employer interests are ―protectable‖ with a noncompete, a score of 10 was 
awarded to a state that has a broadly defined protectable interest.  A score 
of 5 was awarded to a state that has a balanced approach to defining a 
protectable interest and a 0 was awarded to a state that has a strictly defined 
limited protectable interest for the employer. 
This question was given an overall weight of 10 in recognition that the 
element of protectable interest is a key factor in noncompete-based 
litigation.  This issue gets to the heart of a state’s policy choices in that 
states, normally through the common law decisions, essentially sketch the 
parameters of the employer’s rights.  In that sense, the tradeoff between the 
rights of the employee to evade the contract and a court opinion allowing 
enforcement on the grounds of protecting an employer’s knowledge-based 
property rights is a zero-sum game.  Put another way, this question also 
helps establish what a state’s policymakers see as the permissible 
boundaries of employer protections and where the line is crossed into 
employer overreaching at the expense of the employee.  In practical terms, 
states with enforcement policies that mimic existing trade secret and duty 
of loyalty protections for employers received lower ratings, while, 
cumulatively, protections for confidential information, developed customer 
lists, firm good will, nonsolicitation of fellow employees (known as 
poaching or raiding), customer contacts, customer goodwill, and for a 
firm’s investment in training the employee, would increase a state’s 
rating.
91
 
 
 91. These protectable interests tend to indicate that a state has a stronger level of 
enforcement and, consequently, is inclined to protect an employer’s interests over those of 
the departing employee.  See Bishara, supra note 8, at 315, Figure 1A. 
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“Question 3: What must plaintiff be able to show to prove the existence of 
an enforceable covenant not to compete?” 
Regarding this question, a score of 10 was awarded to a state that 
places a weak burden of proof on the plaintiff employer, a 5 was awarded 
to a state that has a balanced approach to the burden placed on the 
employer and a 0 was awarded to a state that places a strong burden of 
proof on the employer.  This question was given an overall weight of 5. 
The assumption related to strength of enforcement with this question 
was that the state’s noncompete-specific contract law decisions would 
reflect a state’s interest in protecting an employer over employees (or vice 
versa), based on the ease with which either party can make a showing to 
carry their burden of proof.  In application at the state level, this question 
tended to concern broader issues of a state’s common law on contract 
litigation and not strictly noncompete disputes and thus was weighted by a 
factor of 5 and not 10. 
“Question 3a: Does the signing of a covenant not to compete at the 
inception of the employment relationship provide sufficient consideration 
to support the covenant?” 
When evaluating this question as an independent data point, the 
highest score of 10 was awarded to a state where the start of employment is 
always sufficient to support a covenant not to compete, a score of around 5 
was awarded to a state where the start of employment is sometimes 
sufficient to support a covenant not to complete and a 0 would be awarded 
to a state where the start of employment is never sufficient consideration to 
support a covenant not to compete.  This question was given an overall 
weight of 10. 
With the issue covered by this question, the basis for the rating and 
ranking scheme is related to an assumption that a state that requires 
independent consideration to support the non-compete agreement is 
expressing a pro-employee sentiment, which tends away from strong 
enforcement.  On the other end of the rating spectrum, if an employer need 
not provide any independent consideration other than the other terms of 
employment (or even the promise to employ, even at-will employment), 
then the state is expressing an employer-friendly, pro-noncompete 
enforcement stance. 
“Question 3b & 3c: Will a change in the terms and conditions of 
employment provide sufficient consideration to support a covenant not to 
compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun?  Will 
continued employment provide sufficient consideration to support a 
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covenant not to compete entered into after the employment relationship has 
begun?” 
For this combined question with subparts, a score of 10 or near ten 
was awarded to a state where continued employment is always sufficient to 
support a covenant not to compete, a median score of around 5 was 
awarded to a state where only a beneficial change in terms was sufficient to 
support a covenant not to compete, and a 0 was awarded to a state where 
neither continued employment nor a beneficial change in terms would be 
sufficient consideration.  These questions were combined and together 
given an overall weight of 5 to reflect the modest impact this issue would 
likely have in policymakers’ views of the strength of enforcement of 
noncompetes in a given jurisdiction. 
These complementary questions get at the state’s enforcement policy, 
like question 3a, because they evidence state’s willingness to favor 
employers or employees in formality with which the requirement 
consideration is treated.  Where an employer is required to present 
additional consideration to support a noncompete, the policy is more 
employee-friendly and represents weaker enforcement sensibilities.  If the 
employee can be made to sign a noncompete agreement after employment 
has commenced and no new consideration is provided, then the policy 
trends toward strong enforcement would be reflected in the state’s rating. 
“Question 4: If the restrictions in the covenant not to compete are 
unenforceable because they are overbroad, are the courts permitted to 
modify the covenant to make the restrictions more narrow and to make the 
covenant enforceable?  If so, under what circumstances will the courts 
allow reduction and what form of reduction will the courts permit?” 
Here a possible high score of 10 was awarded to a state where judicial 
modification is allowed and there are broad circumstances where revisions 
can be made and limited restrictions on maximum enforcement.  A mid-
range score of 5 was awarded to a state where so-called ―blue pencil‖ 
modifications were allowed as a way to reform the contract instead of 
disallowing it outright.  This indicates that there was a balanced approach 
to the allowable scope of restrictions and to accommodating the plaintiff’s 
enforcement request.  A low score, possibly as low as a 0, was awarded to a 
state where neither ―blue pencil‖ nor judicial modification was allowed.  
This question was given an overall weight of 10 to reflect the fact that 
answers to this question are reflective of a state’s overall commitment to 
affirmatively pursuing the intent of the parties in reaching the original 
agreement underlying the restrictive covenant. 
Like some previous questions, Question 4 is related to a jurisdiction’s 
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general law of contract interpretation.  However, the nature of the 
geographic and time restrictions inherent in non-compete clauses makes 
this a particularly salient issue for gauging the strength of a state’s policy 
toward enforcement.  Depending on the broadness of the scope, if courts 
will rewrite the contract to make the terms reasonable, then the rating 
would be higher and with a score at or near 10.  This is based on an 
assumption that a policy of amending contract terms on these parameters is 
evidence of strong enforcement because this act preserves the employer’s 
protectable interests.  Moreover, a policy allowing the court to ―blue 
pencil‖ noncompete terms gives employers more latitude to push 
boundaries or overreach with less fear that the entire agreement will be 
unenforceable. 
“Question 8: If the employer terminates the employment relationship, is the 
covenant enforceable?” 
When evaluating this question, a high score of 10 was awarded to a 
state where a covenant is always enforceable if the employer terminates, a 
score of 5 was given to a state where a covenant is enforceable only in 
some circumstances, and a score of 0 was given to state where a covenant 
is not enforceable if the employer terminates.  This question was given an 
overall weight of 10. 
Like Question 4 above, an affirmative answer to this question 
indicates a strong policy in favor of enforcement in that the employer is 
given more deference than the employee, perhaps at great disadvantage to 
the individual’s mobility and ability to engage in their chosen livelihood.  
For example, a state that allows an employer to fire or lay off an employee 
and still enforce the post-employment restrictions receives a high score 
indicating a policy of strong enforcement.  Other jurisdictions which 
essentially disallow enforcement if the employer initiates the discharge 
would be taking an employee-friendly position and, in effect, displaying a 
policy of weak-enforcement.
92
 
B. Descriptive Analysis and Implications 
After all of the states were rated on each of the seven questions for 
what the status quo was of noncompete enforcement at the 1991 and 2009 
 
 92. Also of note is the fact that, as compared to the other questions, Question 8 and the 
issue it covers was the question that was most often not previously addressed by a state and 
its policymakers.  This fact is interesting because it would seem to indicate that this is an 
area where states can both decisively demonstrate a strong or weak approach to 
enforcement, and because it represents one of the few areas that has not been touched by 
what is normally an extensive body of common law. 
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time periods, the data was weighted, and a ranking for each state during the 
relevant time period was calculated.
93
  States with a low numerical ranking 
are considered to have the strongest noncompete policy regime.  In both 
cases, Florida ranked as the jurisdiction with the strongest enforcement 
laws and attendant policy.  On the other end of the enforcement spectrum, 
in both 1991 and 2009 North Dakota and California—the states with the 
anti-noncompete enforcement statutes without exceptions for any post-
employment restrictions—ranked fifty-one and fifty, respectively.  A table 
summarizing these rankings and a calculation of each state’s net positive or 
negative change in ranking is provided in Figure 1, Strength of 
Enforcement Ranking Change (1991-2009). 
A review of the rankings and the overall data for the most recent 2009 
observation reveals that eighteen states (approximately 35%) have 
noncompete legislation of some sort.  To get a sense of the distribution of 
the raw scores in relation to the rank of each state Figure 2, Strength of 
Enforcement Ranking (2009) with Relative Distribution Highlighted, 
visually shows the distribution using a color scheme (green for a fully 
strong noncompete enforcement policy, shades of yellow for moderate 
enforcement, and red for little or no enforcement). 
From the 2009 ranking data, forty-nine states (96%) and the District of 
Columbia allow some sort of noncompete enforcement.  Within that broad 
range of enforcing states, twelve states (20%) strongly enforce 
noncompetes (based on a range of ―strong‖ raw scores from 410 to 470, 
with New Mexico at a raw score of 410 through Florida at a raw score of 
470).  At the bottom of the rankings, North Dakota received a raw score of 
zero and California received a raw score of thirty-one. 
If the nine states (18%) at the bottom of the rankings that are generally 
weak enforcing states are excluded, the remaining thirty middle-ranked 
states (60%) are moderately enforcing jurisdictions. This indicates that 
despite some clustering on the margins, most jurisdictions fall into the 
moderate enforcing category.  Nonetheless, even the majority of the nine 
bottom-ranked states still have some level of enforcement in certain 
situations, which reinforces the fact that the vast majority of states allow 
post-employment noncompetes of some kind.  In other words, the majority 
of states have a noncompete enforcement policy that places at a relatively 
moderate level among the other jurisdictions. 
Another graph, Figure 3, Strength of Enforcement Ranking, 
Comparison of Change (1991-2009), provides a side-by-side view of the 
changes in state rankings from 1991 to 2009.  Many of the states, as shown 
 
 93. The raw ratings data will be made freely available electronically.  Thus, the weights 
assigned to the various categories of enforcement indicators, while chosen carefully for this 
paper, can easily be modified by other researchers to hone in on specific research questions 
and variables. 
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in other figures, retained the same basic range of rank at both time periods.  
However, there are a few notable outliers that have indicated significant 
changes in their level of noncompete enforcement policy.  For instance, 
Georgia moved thirty spots toward California (i.e., less enforcement) while 
Louisiana saw a near opposite change in rank of twenty-nine spots toward 
more enforcement. 
Other notable changes in state’s rankings between 1991 and 2009 are 
found in the states of Idaho (moved to five from twenty-eight), Vermont 
(moved to fifteen from thirty-five), Iowa (moved to seven from twenty-
two), and Massachusetts (moved to eighteen from seven).  These outliers 
and their direction of change can also be seen in the scatter plot graphs of 
Figure 4, 1991 rank score against 2009 rank score, and Figure 5, 1991 raw 
scores against 2009 raw scores.  Both Figure 4 and Figure 5 also show that 
overall the scores are generally higher in 2009 than 1991, providing 
evidence of a general drift toward more enforcement in the United States in 
the aggregate.  This is, perhaps, due to the greater formalization of 
noncompete policy in the states and a growing collection of observable 
cases of noncompete litigation. 
Figures 6 through 12 show the frequency of scores across each of the 
seven individual noncompete-related questions that were drawn during data 
collection.  Noteworthy is that while some of the graphs show high 
instances of median-level scores, Question 4 (see Figure 11) (allowing the 
―blue pencil‖ modification of terms) and, in particular, Question 8 (see 
Figure 12) (if the circumstances of the employee’s departures impacts 
enforcement) show that there are important indicators of a state’s 
enforcement policy that are not yet even addressed by many states. 
 To get another view of the ranking and strength of enforcement data 
that provides a spatial, geography-based view of the distribution of 
enforcement, the enforcement ―heat‖ mapping of weak-to-moderate-to-
strong levels of enforcement was added to a map of the United States.  The 
maps in Figure 13 (1991) and Figure 14 (2009) provide a visual sense of 
where states rank with regard to their geographic neighbors.  Interestingly, 
based on a plain review of the maps there appears to be no dramatic 
geographic groupings of states with similar levels of enforcement.  The 
maps also provide a view of the snapshot of each period that, when 
compared, does not provide evidence of dramatic change over the eighteen-
year period.  Also noteworthy is that the maps do not provide support for 
any anecdotal sense from legal practitioners that noncompete enforcement 
necessarily weakens west of the Mississippi River. 
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V. APPLYING THE IMPLICATIONS TO ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
NONCOMPETES AND A MARKET FOR LAW 
Based on the findings and implications presented in the previous 
section, what insight does this research provide into assumptions about 
noncompetes and about arguments about the growing role of noncompetes 
in a market for law?  Initially, there are some interesting outlier states that 
experience drastic changes in one direction (particularly Louisiana and 
Georgia), but most states remain generally in the same range of 
enforcement (i.e., a moderate range) after the eighteen-year period. 
However, there is a measurable drift of the aggregate policies in the 
United States toward greater enforcement.  This trend gives some support 
to Professor Glynn’s thesis that states will enter a market for law that will 
have participating jurisdictions rendering employer-favorable rulings for 
the cases they do choose to adjudicate.  This is also consistent with 
conclusions reached by Professors Garrison and Wendt about the general 
increase in enforcement across the United States. 
Nonetheless, the states that do not enforce or have rather weak 
enforcement are very much in the minority.  The states that have aggressive 
pro-enforcement policies and laws favoring noncompetes are also on the 
margins.  Thus, the majority of states have followed a moderate course that 
seems to comport with traditional noncompete aesthetics of moderation 
through narrowly tailored and balanced—and reasonable—protectable 
interests that foster business investments in workers’ human capital.  In this 
sense, Professor Glynn’s assertion that a prerequisite to ―[e]nhanced 
employer demand for state employment law‖ will arise when ―there are 
substantial differences in state legal regimes‖ may still be accurate, if not 
occurring at this time.
94
  However, while there is some variance among 
states on the margins, this research does not provide support for an 
assertion that there is currently a movement toward significant differences 
among many jurisdictions.  In support of this conclusion is an observation 
that while a small handful of states have adopted industry-specific 
noncompete policies to address noncompetes for on-air broadcasters, these 
have not proliferated, nor have other industries successfully lobbied for 
noncompete law exceptions to benefit their narrow interests.
95
 
Yet Glynn’s insights about the place of noncompetes in a market for 
law are not without merit in the sense that he predicts this shift will 
continue and that some states, like Delaware, may have the leverage to 
 
 94. Glynn, supra note 7, at 1385. 
 95. See Melissa Ilyse Rassas, Explaining the Outlier: Oregon’s new Non-Compete 
Agreement Law and the Broadcasting Industry, 11 U. PENN J. BUS. L. 447 (2009) 
(illustrating an example of a recent broadcaster-focused noncompete policy regime). 
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exploit a market for noncompetes if they chose to do so.
96
  The results of 
the study described herein do not support the sort of polarization or drastic 
changes that might mark a race to the bottom toward either end of the 
enforcement spectrum.  In any event, the trend for some states to adopt 
brand new or revised statutes addressing subtleties of enforcement, such as 
limiting the permissible scope of covered employees based on salary floors, 
is evidence that the law of noncompete enforcement is very much being 
debated and refined by the states.  The point is that at this moment and 
since the early 1990s, there is not convincing evidence in this research of a 
sea change in the manner in which states interact with business interests in 
a race to the bottom.  Evidence for that dramatic trend would be present if, 
for instance, this research revealed that many states were noticeably 
increasing the strength of their enforcement or if numerous legislative 
changes were made to reflect industry lobbying efforts. 
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICYMAKERS, BUSINESS, AND INDIVIDUAL 
EMPLOYEES 
Despite repeated calls for the abandonment of any sort of noncompete 
enforcement from some quarters, the data shows that most states enforce 
noncompetes and that they are not becoming more California-like in their 
approach.  In fact, the opposite is somewhat true because in the aggregate 
enforcement is increasing across the country.  In light of the research 
presented above and conclusions about the state of noncompete 
enforcement across the United States, the next issue to address is what 
policymakers, the courts, businesses, and employees should do with these 
conclusions.  Also, what other research is needed on this topic? 
A. Recommendations for Policymakers 
For the state legislatures and the courts it seems that there is indeed 
room to both develop more thoughtful, modern policies and to differentiate 
their states from other peer jurisdictions.  If, indeed, a state chooses to 
consciously modify its current approach to enforcement and enter a race to 
attract business based on its noncompete policy, this research provides a 
new dimension of information to show a state where it stands in relation to 
states it wants to emulate or to avoid.  In other words, these findings will 
assist a state by letting it know where it ranks, thereby giving it some 
needed context to determine where it stands in relation to other states, 
based on industry, geography, or a business development ambition, instead 
 
 96. See Glynn, supra note 7, at 1432 (arguing that Delaware is ―well positioned‖ to 
engage in competition for ―NCA business,‖ as are potentially other states such as New 
York). 
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of having a haphazard approach to a potential race to the bottom. 
In that sense, the fact that this research fills a void in the literature by 
providing a comprehensive comparison across states is crucial to 
jurisdictions that are examining their policies on knowledge spillovers and 
employee mobility—and potential alternatives to noncompetes.  Even 
where noncompetes are not an issue because they are disallowed, as in 
Silicon Valley, firms come up with workaround solutions to address fears 
that their competitors will learn by hiring away their top talent
97
 or other 
ways to mimic noncompetes.
98
  Accordingly, a state legislature is wise to 
proactively address these alternatives head on. 
Another group of important and influential employment law 
policymakers that will find this research useful is the drafters and 
opponents of the Restatement of Employment Law (3rd), which is currently 
under revision and discussion by members of the American Law Institute 
(―ALI‖).  For several years, legal scholars in employment law have 
critiqued the approach and even the mere idea of a new Restatement of 
Employment Law.
99
  Perhaps the apogee of this criticism arrived with a 
motion at the ALI’s 2008 national meeting on behalf of the Labor Law 
Trust Group to stop the Restatement development process.  That motion 
was made alongside an open letter signed by 66 leading employment and 
labor law professors indicating that they do not support the endeavor and to 
―strongly urge‖ the ALI ―to terminate this project.‖100  In sum, the 
 
 97. See, e.g., Miguel Helft, Unwritten Code Rules Silicon Valley Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 3, 2009, at B11 (reporting on a U.S. Department of Justice antitrust investigation into 
Silicon Valley firms such as Apple, Microsoft, Google, Genentech, Intel, and Yahoo related 
to evidence that firms have unwritten agreements not to pursue employees at other firms, 
particularly partner firms). 
 98. Commentators are also arguing for alternatives to covenants not to compete, such as 
Garden Leave and training cost repayment from the new employer, as a way of addressing 
the employer, employee, and innovation concerns over labor mobility and human capital 
investment.  See, e.g., Brandon S. Long, Note, Protecting Employer Investment in Training: 
Noncompetes vs. Repayment Agreements, 54 DUKE L. J. 1295 (2005) (arguing that 
repayment agreements are sensible alternatives to traditional noncompetes because such 
agreements offer employers protection in lockstep with the cost of the actual training). 
 99. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Response to Working Group on Chapter 2 of the 
Proposed Restatement of Employment Law: Putting the Restatement in its Place, 13 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 143, 146 (2009) (citations omitted) (―What we have seen is a widely 
documented trend toward short term employment, the rise of contingent labor, the rollback 
of employer sponsored health plans and benefits, a reversion to external labor market 
practices, and, more recently, the most significant economic downturn since the Great 
Depression‖).  See also Matthew W. Finkin, Second Thoughts on a Restatement of 
Employment Law, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 280 (2005) (doubting that a Restatement 
of Employment Law would have the ability to clarify existing employment nor successfully 
push for genuine law reform). 
 100. Letter and Petition from The Labor Trust Group to the Council of the American 
Law Institute, at 3 (May 15, 2008) (on file with author), available at 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2008/05/ali-and-the-pen.html. 
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opposition stems from a belief, ―that the velocity and direction of legal 
change in the employment relationship is incapable of being addressed by a 
Restatement; that the Restatement method, if it proves influential (as the 
Institute would surely wish it to be), will stultify legal experimentation and 
growth.‖101 
The research in this article presents a new and detailed picture of 
noncompete enforcement across the states, which is an issue that is of key 
importance to the employment relationship at the heart of the Restatement 
controversy.  Accordingly, the study’s conclusion that states are still 
exploring and honing their approach to the nationally important issue of 
noncompete enforcement gives credence to the opposition’s criticism that 
experimentation in at least this area of employment law is alive and well at 
the state level. 
B. Recommendations for Future Research 
While the implications herein are useful to help dispel certain 
assumptions about modern noncompete policy across the United States in 
terms of trends and where states rank, the conclusions also raise other 
questions worthy of further investigation.  For instance, follow-on 
empirical work based on these initial descriptive statistics is welcome and 
could feature the inclusion of several other variables related to issues of 
industry, worker education, salary, and access to knowledge that, combined 
with information about enforcement distribution, will develop a picture of 
mobility among certain types of workers.  A missing component of the 
existing noncompete research is statistical information on the actual 
number of these agreements in place at various times within defined 
industries and jurisdictions.  Unfortunately, this is not easily obtainable 
because most noncompetes are not publicly reported or catalogued.  This 
information would be a useful way to see trends and concretely gauge the 
use of noncompetes.  Along those lines, once the depth of the use of 
noncompetes is clearer, then it is possible to make a more comprehensive 
evaluation about the propriety of these contracts when used for certain 
types of workers or specific industries. 
This understanding would be ultimately useful in that it will better 
inform policymakers who, like those in states which are proposing 
graduated enforcement of noncompetes based on an employee’s wages, are 
still experimenting with new policies.  More research is also needed to 
determine the extent of how the strength of enforcement impedes otherwise 
socially beneficial knowledge spillovers.  A related issue that warrants 
exploration is the extent to which variances in noncompete enforcement 
 
 101. Id. at 2. 
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among the states drives labor flows related to a market for law and if those 
differences actually foster employer abuse and overreaching at the expense 
of employees. 
C. Recommendations for Business and Employees 
The issue of the strength of noncompete enforcement of a specific 
jurisdiction implicates both employees and employers, but tends to do so in 
opposite ways.  In the case of these implications concerning noncompete 
enforcement, it will impact the ability of employees and employers to 
predict the likelihood that mobility will be hindered in a certain state.  It 
will also provide both constituencies with more information about the value 
of bargaining for choice of law and forum provisions during contract 
negotiations. 
The national picture of noncompete enforcement also allows these 
groups to better recognize the limitations of non-compete contracts, 
particularly in light of the strength of various jurisdictions when one party 
has the initial opportunity to trigger the legal coverage of a state favorable 
to their litigation goals.  For business, the implications of this study will 
clearly illustrate the state of play of noncompete enforcement and thus 
increase the likelihood that a firm will effectively consider noncompete 
policy implications in making strategic human capital-related decisions.
102
  
For example, this research can better inform a firm about where and when 
to use covenants not to compete and where and when to use other legal and 
business mechanisms to accomplish similar business goals.
103
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Beyond the legal research on noncompetes and the market for law 
phenomenon, there is an intuitively derived understanding of a market for 
noncompete policies, albeit one not clearly based on documented 
 
 102. This increased awareness that legal strategy matters for strategic management and 
for sustaining competitive advantage is consistent with trends in the management and legal 
studies literature.  See, e.g., Constance E. Bagley, Winning Legally: The Value of Legal 
Astuteness, 33 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 378 (2008) (detailing managers’ abilities to use business 
laws to craft efficient market strategies); David Orozco, Legal Knowledge as an Intellectual 
Property Management Resource, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 687 (discussing the value of legal 
knowledge as a foundation for strategic behavior). 
 103. For the legal practitioner’s perspective and related advice on the proper use of 
noncompetes by employers, see Robert B. Gordon, Analysis and Perspective: Advice for 
Employers in Using Noncompete Agreements to Retain Employees, 78 U.S. L. WK. 2231 
(Oct. 27, 2009).  ―In short, the best noncompete is the one that can be successfully enforced; 
and that means drafting them to close the most commonly claimed loopholes. . . . [and] [t]he 
best strategy for talent retention is the one that motivates an employee with rewards if he 
stays, not the one that threatens him with legal risks if he leaves.‖  Id. at 2231-32. 
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evidence.
104
  However, based on the evidence discussed above, it is not at 
all clear that states have yet to fully appreciate the potential gains from 
marketing their noncompete laws or to engage in the feared race to the 
bottom that would be a feature of a true market for law. 
The implications for law and business discussed in this article will 
help address gaps in the literature about the relative enforcement of 
noncompete agreements and provide much needed additional context to 
policymakers, as well as employers and employees, about the trends in the 
market for employment law and the status of noncompete policy.  
Moreover, future researchers will now have a more well-crafted and 
detailed tool with which to evaluate the role of noncompetes in crucial and 
evolving areas of law and policy such as trade secret protection, the 
preservation of goodwill, and the impact of employee mobility across state 
boundaries. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 104. For example, see the passionately argued concerns about job loss to non-enforcing 
states as voiced by state-level employee advocates such as Mantell, supra note 1, and 
accompanying text. 
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APPENDIX OF TABLES AND FIGURES 
Fig. 1.  Strength of Enforcement Ranking Change (1991-2009)  
(1=strongest; 51=weakest) 
  
State Name 
1991 
Rank 
2009 
Rank 
Change in 
Rank 
Alabama 12 19 7 
Alaska 48 48 0 
Arizona 40 36 -4 
Arkansas 49 49 0 
California 50 50 0 
Colorado 20 26 6 
Connecticut 4 3 -1 
Delaware 34 26 -8 
Dist. of Colum. 35 38 3 
Florida 1 1 0 
Georgia 13 43 30 
Hawaii 41 30 -11 
Idaho 28 5 -23 
Illinois 5 4 -1 
Indiana 13 21 8 
Iowa 22 7 -15 
Kansas 9 2 -7 
Kentucky 10 10 0 
Louisiana 42 13 -29 
Maine 24 21 -3 
Maryland 23 15 -8 
Massachusetts 7 18 11 
Michigan 15 15 0 
Minnesota 25 34 9 
Mississippi 25 26 1 
Missouri 3 7 4 
Montana 47 46 -1 
Nebraska 44 44 0 
Nevada 38 33 -5 
N. Hampshire 17 24 7 
New Jersey 11 7 -4 
New Mexico 6 12 6 
New York 35 42 7 
North Carolina 29 35 6 
North Dakota 51 51 0 
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Fig. 2.  Strength of Enforcement Ranking (2009) with Relative Distribution 
Highlighted (1 = strongest; 51 = weakest) 
 
 
 
 
 
State Name 
1991 
Rank 
2009 
Rank 
Change in 
Rank 
Ohio 25 31 6 
Oklahoma 46 47 1 
Oregon 17 24 7 
Pennsylvania 29 23 -6 
Rhode Island 39 37 -2 
South Carolina 42 38 -4 
South Dakota 15 11 -4 
Tennessee 17 19 2 
Texas 21 32 11 
Utah 2 6 4 
Vermont 35 15 -20 
Virginia 29 38 9 
Washington 8 13 5 
West Virginia 44 44 0 
Wisconsin 33 41 8 
Wyoming 32 26 -6 
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Fig. 3.  Strength of Enforcement Ranking, Comparison of Change (1991- 
2009) (1=strongest; 51=weakest) 
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Fig.4.  1991 rank score plotted against 2009 rank.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5.  1991 raw score plotted against 2009 raw score.  
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Fig. 6.  Question 1 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with 
Each Ratings  
 
  
Fig. 7.  Question 2 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with 
Each Ratings  
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Fig. 8.  Question 3 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with  
Each Ratings  
 
 
Fig. 9.  Question 3(a) Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with 
Each Ratings  
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Fig. 10.  Question 3(b)/3(c) Frequency Distribution of the Number of States 
with Each Ratings  
 
 
 
Fig. 11.  Question 4 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with 
Each Ratings  
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Fig. 12.  Question 8 Frequency Distribution of the Number of States with 
Each Ratings  
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Fig.13. 1991 Geographic Distribution of the Strength of Enforcement 
Ranking (with raw scores per state) 
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Fig. 14.  2009 Geographic Distribution of the Strength of Enforcement  
Ranking (with raw scores per state) 
 
 
